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Introduction 
On 23 June 2016, 52 per cent of voters that participated in the Brexit referendum voted to leave 
the EU. The message of the Leave Campaign to ‘take back control’ struck a chord with the 
majority of the electorate. Notwithstanding the separate reasons that led each and every one of 
those voters to vote in favour of the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, it is interesting to note 
that the UK government has interpreted this vote as an urge to shield the UK legal order from the 
influence of EU law. The prime minister, Theresa May, in her first speech in a party conference 
as leader of the Conservative party noted: ‘Our laws [should be] made not in Brussels but in 
Westminster. Our judges [should be] sitting not in Luxembourg but in courts across the land. The 
authority of EU law in this country [should be] ended forever.’1 
The stance of the UK government towards EU law and its main interpreter, the Court of Justice 
is hardly surprising, if one takes into account the following. First, even from the very beginning 
of the UK’s EU membership, the EU law principles of primacy and direct effect upon which the 
EU constitutional order is founded were sitting uncomfortably with parliamentary sovereignty 
which consists of the paramount principle of the UK legal order. Brexit offers an unprecedented 
opportunity to the UK legal order to ‘divorce’ from those ‘foreign’ legal principles that have 
created tectonic changes to it. Second, the result of the referendum shed light on the fact that the 
UK electorate was not in support of the current level of EU integration. Of course, ‘integration is 
fundamentally a political process’ but ‘law has a vital role to play in the process.’2 In that sense, 
the detachment of the UK legal order from that of the EU and its institutions is almost a logical 
consequence of that vote.  
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Having said that, the EU and the UK legal orders have been in a symbiotic relationship for more 
than four decades. To give but one example, there are thousands of directly applicable EU 
regulations, binding in their entirety, that have ‘parachuted’ within the UK legal order without 
any national transposing measure. So, an abrupt ‘clean’ end to that relationship would be almost 
impossible without the domestic legal order suffering from a seismic ripple effect. Moreover, 
given that the EU is a ‘community of law’, ‘designing an ambitious economic partnership which 
respects the freedoms and principles of the EU, and the wishes of the British people’ as the prime 
minister declared in her Florence speech3 means that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) will inevitably be influencing the UK legal order for the foreseeable future. 
The present chapter focuses on the aforementioned themes by analysing the relationship between 
the Court of Justice and the UK legal order after Brexit takes place. It revisits the challenge that 
the EU principles of primacy and direct effect raised for the UK constitutional order. It explains 
the role that the Agreement on the UK’s Withdrawal from the EU (hereafter WA) envisages for 
the CJEU.4 Finally, it describes the role of the Court of Justice in the UK legal order after Brexit 
takes place by reference to the EU Withdrawal Act 2018 and the Agreement on the Future 
Relationship (hereafter FRA).  
The analysis of the strained relationship between the UK and the EU and its apex court provided 
in this chapter can be seen in the broader context of the challenges that international 
organisations and international courts face at the moment from various states. The United States 
has not contributed to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation 
(UNESCO) budget since 2011 and plans to quit in 2018, while it has been delaying the process 
of appointments in the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body. Burundi left the 
International Criminal Court and it remains unclear whether South Africa will also exit the Rome 
Statute system. In that sense, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU institutional framework is a 
symptom of a more widespread global phenomenon. At the same time, as a result both of the 
symbiotic relationship of the UK and EU legal orders and of the role that is envisaged for the 
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CJEU in the future relationship between the UK and the EU, the CJEU will remain an important 
actor in the UK order. 
The past: the UK and the judge-made EU law principles 
‘The question of the legal status of norms of European Union law within the legal order of the 
Member States’ has been omnipresent since the very first years of the life of the EU.’5 Even at 
that early period, the Court of Justice understood the then European Economic Community as ‘a 
new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their 
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields and the subjects of which comprise not only member 
states but also their nationals.’6 As an answer to that question, the Court established the 
principles of direct effect and primacy (or supremacy) in its early case law.7 
Direct effect allows individuals to rely on an EU law provision before a national court. It is the 
capacity of any EU law provision whose wording is clear, precise and unconditional to be 
applied in domestic court proceedings.8 At the same time, the Court in Costa held that whenever 
there is a conflict between a norm of EU law and one of national law, EU law ‘… could not … 
be overridden by domestic legal provisions … without being deprived of its character as [Union] 
law and without the legal basis of the [EU] itself being called into question.’9 This is why 
‘Primacy denotes the capacity of [an EU law provision] to overrule inconsistent norms of 
national law in domestic court proceedings.’10 In Simmenthal, the CJEU went a step further by 
ruling that national courts have the power to disapply/set aside a national law provision and 
apply an EU law one in case they are in conflict. This may happen even in cases where the 
national legal framework does not provide the courts with such power of judicial review.11 
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Primacy and direct effect were ‘certainly well established in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom joined the [then] Community’.12 It was 
foreseeable that those norms would sit somewhat uncomfortably with a legal order which is 
founded on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
According to the Diceyan orthodoxy, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty means ‘that 
Parliament … has, under the English Constitution, the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever; and, further, that no person or body recognised by the law of England as having a 
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament’.13 This means, first, that the UK 
Parliament possesses supreme lawmaking power that allows itself to pass legislation concerning 
anything.14 Second, no Parliament can bind its successors. Third, and more important for the 
purposes of the present chapter, a valid Act of Parliament cannot be set aside/disapplied by a 
court.  
Bearing that in mind, the seismic impact of the Factortame decision is unsurprising.15 In that 
case, the then highest court of the land, the House of Lords disapplied – for the first time since 
the Glorious Revolution – an Act of the UK Parliament so as to give priority to a directly 
effective principle of EU law. The effect of EU law, however, has not been limited to 
introducing a limited form of judicial review in a constitutional system that is founded on 
parliamentary sovereignty. In Thoburn, Sir John Laws introduced the idea that the UK legal 
order recognises a hierarchy of statutes by accepting the distinction between ‘ordinary statutes’ 
and ‘constitutional statutes’.16 The latter are immune from implied repeal. According to Lords 
Neuberger and Mance, ‘[T]he United Kingdom has no written constitution, but we have a 
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number of constitutional instruments. They include […] the European Communities Act 1972.’17 
This finding has been reaffirmed in Miller.18 
So the influence of EU law in the transformation of the UK legal order cannot be overestimated. 
Lord Denning has described EU law as an ‘… incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up 
the rivers.’19 It is therefore unsurprising that the UK government decided to limit, if not 
eliminate, the influence of EU law from the domestic legal order after Brexit takes place. In fact, 
Prime Minister Theresa May declared in her Lancaster House speech that after Brexit all laws 
governing the UK will be made in the UK and ‘will be interpreted by judges not in Luxembourg 
but in courts across this country’.20 But can the UK legal order become watertight from the tide 
of EU law and CJEU case law even after Brexit takes place? A brief examination of the currently 
negotiated Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and the recently approved EU (Withdrawal) Act 1998 
might suggest otherwise. 
The present I: the CJEU and the Withdrawal Agreement 
To start with, ‘the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction as provided for 
in the Treaties’ for the duration of the transition period.21 But even after the end of the transition, 
the CJEU and its case law will continue to play a significant role especially in the area of 
citizens’s rights. 
Despite the polarised rhetoric concerning free movement of persons during the Brexit 
referendum, the UK and the EU managed to agree fairly quickly on the issue of post-Brexit 
citizens’ rights. Accordingly, all EU citizens residing at the UK and all UK citizens in the EU 27 
at the end of the transition period (31 December 2020) will retain their rights of residence and 
work and most notably the right to equal treatment as currently derived from EU law. In the 
December Joint Report, the UK and the EU pointed out that the WA should ‘enable the effective 
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exercise of rights derived from Union law and based on past life choices.’22 Part 2 of the WA 
(Articles 9 to 39) enshrines those rights through direct references to the relevant primary and 
secondary EU legislation including the citizens’ rights Directive,23 Regulation 492/201124 and 
Regulation 883/2004.25 
To protect those rights both for UK citizens living in the EU and EU citizens living in the UK 
and to give them legal certainty, the two parties accepted that appropriate mechanisms should be 
established26 and that the CJEU is the ‘ultimate arbiter of the interpretation of EU law.’27 So, the 
WA provides for a ‘voluntary preliminary reference procedure’. According to Article 158 WA, 
the UK courts will be able to send preliminary references related to the part of the WA that 
regulates citizens’ rights. This avenue of judicial assistance will be available for any litigation 
that has started up to eight years after the end of the transition period. The only difference 
between this voluntary procedure and the one described in Article 267 TFEU is that the UK 
courts of last instance will not be obliged to refer. In other words, the obligation of the courts of 
last instance to refer to the CJEU in accordance with Article 267(3) TFEU and the CILFIT case 
law28 on ‘acte clair’ will not be part of the legal framework established by the WA. Despite this, 
the Court of Justice will be able to influence the British legal life for a number of years after 
Brexit at least with regard to the very sensitive issue of citizens’ rights. 
However, citizens’ rights is not the only area of the WA where a dispute settlement mechanism 
should be established. According to the European Council’s guidelines, the WA ‘should include 
appropriate dispute settlement and enforcement mechanisms regarding the application and 
interpretation of the [whole] withdrawal agreement’.29 According to Article 167 WA, the EU and 
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the UK should ‘make every attempt through cooperation and consultations’ to reach a settlement 
of any dispute concerning the WA. Judicial mechanisms should be considered as a last resort 
when it comes to the settlement of any dispute. This is why at first instance, the two parties ‘shall 
endeavour to resolve any dispute regarding the interpretation and application of the provisions of 
this Agreement by entering into consultations in the Joint Committee in good faith, with the aim 
of reaching a mutually agreed solution.’30 Such Joint Committee will be comprised of 
representatives of both the UK and the EU.31  
According to Article 170 WA, ‘[w]here no agreed solution can be reached, either party to the 
WA may request the establishment of an arbitration panel.’32 The arbitration panel will be 
comprised of five persons.33 The EU and the UK will each nominate two persons from a list of 
ten they will have submitted by the end of the transition period.34 The chairperson will be 
selected by consensus by the four members of the panel.35 The existence of such arbitration panel 
was not part of the initial draft WA. As such, it ‘can be considered a negotiating success for the 
UK which had been pressing for an arbitration mechanism (instead of the ECJ as the ultimate 
arbiter).’36 
More interestingly, for the purposes of the chapter, 
Where a dispute submitted to arbitration in accordance with this Title raises a question of 
interpretation of a concept of Union law, a question of interpretation of a provision of 
Union law referred to in this Agreement or a question of whether the United Kingdom 
has complied with its obligations under Article 89(2), the arbitration panel shall not 
decide on any such question. In such case, it shall request the Court of Justice of the 
European Union to give a ruling on the question. The Court of Justice of the European 
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Union shall have jurisdiction to give such a ruling which shall be binding on the 
arbitration panel.37  
This means that notwithstanding the existence of an arbitration panel, the CJEU will still have an 
important role in the monitoring of the correct implementation of the WA. 
Be that as it may, the biggest obstacle that the two parties faced in reaching an agreement on the 
WA related to the border between Ireland and the UK. Theresa May’s government had been 
trying to find the balance between two seemingly irreconcilable goals. The UK aimed to leave 
the single market and the customs union, without returning to a hard border on the island of 
Ireland.38  
The text of the Joint Report, reached between the UK and the EU in December 2017 included a 
formula to ‘square the circle’. It stated that the aim of the future trade negotiations would be to 
address the challenge of the Irish border through the overall EU-UK relationship. If the future 
trade agreement finds it impossible to provide for a frictionless invisible border, then, ‘specific 
[technological] solutions’ will apply to Northern Ireland. If the UK and the EU cannot agree on 
those ‘specific solutions’, then either the UK as a whole, or Northern Ireland, will remain aligned 
to the single market and the customs union after Brexit takes place.39 	
That third ‘backstop option’ was legally codified in a protocol contained in the Draft WA. It said 
that – should no specific solution be found – a common regulatory area comprising the European 
Union and Northern Ireland will be established and Northern Ireland will remain in the EU 
customs territory. May vehemently rejected the plan and said that ‘No UK prime minister could 
agree to it’40  because it ‘threatens [the UK] constitutional integrity’.41 This is why the final draft 
of the WA included a significant compromise. According to it, the UK as a whole will be in a 
‘bare bones’ customs union with the EU while Northern Ireland will remain aligned to those 
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rules of the single market that are necessary to maintain the free movement of goods across the 
Irish border.42  
More interestingly for the purposes of the present chapter, the ‘Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall have jurisdiction as provided for in the Treaties’ with regard to the application of the 
EU acquis in Northern Ireland.43 In particular, the Court of Justice will have jurisdiction over the 
interpretation of EU customs legislation;44 the rules of the single market in goods as far as they 
apply under the backstop;45 VAT and excise rules;46 agriculture and environment;47 the single 
electricity market;48 and state aid.49 Thus, it is obvious that the CJEU will continue playing a 
significant role with regard to a part of the UK at least. 
The present II: the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 
On 26 June 2018, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 received royal assent. The 
constitutional significance of that piece of legislation cannot be overstated. Section 1 repeals the 
European Communities Act 1972 which is considered one of the ‘constitutional statutes’ of the 
United Kingdom.50 Crucially, however, its purpose is to preserve and carry over into UK law the 
full body of EU law even after Brexit takes place as provided in sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Act.  
The reason why a legislative act that was initially called ‘the Great Repeal Act’ ‘copies and 
pastes’ huge swathes of EU law in the legal order of a future third country is the following. 
Given the symbiotic relationship of the two legal orders for more than 40 years, there are 
thousands of directly applicable and directly effective pieces of EU law that would cease to 
apply to the UK after Brexit takes place. This would mean that legal vacuums would be created 
in a number of areas such as environmental law, consumer protection, workers’ rights etc. In 
order to avoid such a situation, it was of utmost importance that the UK administration and 
Westminster would find a way to bridge those gaps without clogging up the parliamentary 
timetable for years to come.  
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Interestingly, the arrangement is very similar to the ‘continuance clauses’ of former colonies on 
independence from the UK as Douglas-Scott has noted.51 For instance, section 4(1) of the 
Constitution of Jamaica reads: 
All laws which are in force in Jamaica immediately before the appointed day shall 
(subject to amendment or repeal by the authority having power to amend or repeal any 
such law) continue in force on and after that day, and all laws which have been made 
before that day but have not previously been brought into operation may (subject as 
aforesaid) be brought into force, in accordance with any provision in that behalf, on or 
after that day, but all such laws shall, subject to the provisions of this section, be 
construed, in relation to any period beginning on or after the appointed day, with such 
adaptations and modifications as may be necessary to bring them into conformity with 
the provisions of this Order.52 
Be that as it may, section 5 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act addresses the role of the judge-made EU 
law principle of primacy post-Brexit. The general rule is that the principle of primacy does not 
apply to any UK law that is passed after the exit day.53 However, if Parliament intends that 
primacy should apply with regard to a certain post-Brexit legislative modification, then the UK 
courts should act accordingly.54 More importantly for the purposes of the present chapter, section 
5(2) ‘introduces a new legal hierarchy into the UK’s constitutional system’.55 According to this 
section, the principle of primacy will apply to retained EU law, that is to say, EU law that has 
been passed before Brexit including rights created by the case law of the Court56 as it relates to 
other pre-Brexit legislation. So, the retained EU law will have priority over any law enacted 
before Brexit pointing to the fact that the most important principle that was laid out by the Court 
will have a lasting effect in the UK legal order for years to come. 
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Consistent with the aim of the government to remove the influence of the CJEU on the UK legal 
order,57 section 6(1)(a) provides that after Brexit, the UK courts are ‘not bound by any principles 
or decisions made … by the European Court’. They are also prohibited from sending a 
preliminary reference question to the Court of Justice58 with the exception of cases on citizens’ 
rights that are raised within the first eight years after the end of the transition period. However, 
even after Brexit takes place, any UK court may take into account the case law of the Court of 
Justice.59 In any case, UK courts regularly engage with the jurisdiction of foreign courts which 
they treat as persuasive but not a binding authority. In fact, the UK government has admitted that 
it is possible that ‘Account is to be taken of CJEU decisions [...] where there is a shared interest 
in reducing or eliminating divergence in how specific aspects of an agreement with the EU are 
implemented.’60 
Concerning retained EU law, section 6(3) of the Act requires the UK courts to interpret the 
retained EU law ‘in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of 
EU law’. The term ‘retained EU case law’ refers to ‘any principles laid down by, and any 
decisions of, the European Court, as they have effect in EU law’ before Brexit unless there is an 
explicit exception either in section 5 or in Schedule 1.61 As previously discussed, section 5 
excludes the principle of primacy of EU law. Schedule 1 on the other hand, provides that ‘There 
is no right in domestic law [after Brexit takes place] to damages’ for non-contractual state 
liability in accordance with Francovich.62  
Notwithstanding those exceptions, it seems certain that the case law of the Court of Justice will 
influence the legal status of a significant part of UK legislation (namely, retained EU law) and as 
such the UK legal order. This body of legislation, in fact, will have primacy over any other piece 
of pre-Brexit national legislation.  
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However, not all the UK courts will be obliged to provide for legal continuity by following the 
retained EU law. The UK Supreme Court and the Scottish High Court of Judiciary are asked to 
treat this retained EU case law in the same way that they would treat their own.63 
So far, we have seen how the WA – which at the time of writing is still being negotiated – and 
the recently approved EU (Withdrawal) Act will allow the Court of Justice and its well-
established case law to influence the UK legal order even after Brexit takes place. A question 
remains, however, as to what the influence of the Court will be in the future relationship between 
the UK and the EU. How might the Agreement on the Future Relationship (hereafter FRA) – that 
will only be negotiated once the UK becomes a non-member of the EU– envisage the role of the 
CJEU? 
The future: the future agreement 
According to Article 50(2) TEU (Treaty on European Union), the EU ‘shall negotiate and 
conclude an agreement with [the UK], setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal taking 
account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union.’ Indeed, a political 
declaration that sets out the framework of the future UK-EU relationships was published at the 
same time as the WA.64 The negotiations for the agreement, however, will only start after Brexit 
takes place on 29 March 2019 and will be conducted in accordance with Article 218 TFEU 
(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The latter is of significant importance. It 
means that the FRA may be subject to an opinion of the CJEU according to Article 218(11) 
TFEU.  
The Court has a long history of judicially reviewing international agreements of the EU with 
often unexpected results. A recent example is Opinion 1/13 where the Court struck down the 
agreement on the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
because it violated the principle of autonomy of the Union legal order, among other things.65 It 
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Leaders.pdf> accessed 1 December 2018. 
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did so, despite the fact that it took part both in the negotiations and in the drafting of that 
agreement. So, given its history in judicially reviewing international agreements, it is important 
to understand the limits that its case law sets in designing the dispute settlement mechanisms of 
the FRA. 
The EU has made clear from the beginning that any dispute settlement scheme would need to 
respect the principle of autonomy of the Union legal order including the role of the Court of 
Justice66 and the UK has tacitly accepted that.67 According to the settled case law of the CJEU, 
this principle sets certain constraints in the event that international agreements concluded by the 
EU provide for dispute settlement through judicial or quasi-judicial bodies other than the Court 
of Justice itself. Such dispute settlement bodies ‘must not have the effect of binding the EU and 
its institutions, in the exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of the rules 
of EU law’.68 So any judicial or quasi-judicial body established by the Agreement on the post-
Brexit relationship of the EU with the UK to settle disputes may not interpret provisions ‘which 
are identical to provisions of [Union] law’.69 Finally, it is possible for the agreement on the 
future relationship to ‘confer new powers on the Court, provided that in so doing it does not 
change the nature of [its] function’ as conceived in the EU treaties.70 
Recently, the UK put forward a blueprint for the future relationship: the Chequers agreement.71 
The new plan proposes to establish a free trade area for goods between the UK and the EU where 
‘a common rulebook for goods including agri-food’ will exist.72 The UK will commit, by 
international agreement, ‘to ongoing harmonisation with EU rules on goods’.73 This echoes 
the mechanism of the European Economic Area whose members have to adopt the new or 
reformed regulations that the EU institutions produce. At the same time, the government 
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contends that parliament can guard the UK legal order from future EU legislation in an 
arrangement that somehow resembles the EU’s relationship with Switzerland.  
Be that as it may, in the White Paper on the future relationship, the UK states that disputes under 
this arrangement should be raised in the Joint Committee comprised of representatives both of 
the UK and the EU. In the event that the Committee fails to resolve the dispute by negotiation, an 
independent arbitration panel should be formed.74 In the area of goods where the UK has decided 
to adhere to the common rulebook, a referral to the CJEU for interpretation of the relevant rules 
will also be available to the Joint Committee and the arbitration panel.75 In other words, the UK 
wants to opt for a system of dispute resolution through arbitration with an in-built possibility of 
referring to the Court of Justice, similar to the WA. The EU has accepted that in principle.76 This 
again shows that the influence of the CJEU to the UK legal order will remain significant for 
years to come. 
To be sure, the negotiations on the future relationship have barely started while the EU has 
remained lukewarm if not totally unconvinced with regard to the Chequers proposal.77 Having 
said that, it is worth noting two distinct but interrelated issues that relate to the dispute resolution 
system that the Political Declaration favours. There is nothing particularly innovative about the 
establishment of a Joint Committee as the primary venue of dispute settlement. Apart from the 
WA itself that provides for such a body, a number of free trade agreements also establish a Joint 
Committee responsible for the overall functioning of the agreement. Such Committee has the 
primary role for resolving disputes through negotiations. The recent EU-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement, for instance, establishes a Trade Committee.78  
The Trade Committee shall:  
(a)  ensure that this Agreement operates properly;  
(b)  supervise and facilitate the implementation and application of this Agreement, and 
further its general aims;  
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(c)  supervise the work of all specialised committees, working groups and other bodies 
established under this Agreement;  
(d)  consider ways to further enhance trade relations between the Parties;  
(e)  without prejudice to Chapter Fourteen (Dispute Settlement) and Chapter Fifteen 
(Mediation Mechanism), seek to solve problems which might arise in areas covered 
by this Agreement, or resolve disputes that may arise regarding the interpretation or 
application of this Agreement; and  
(f)  consider any other matter of interest relating to an area covered by this Agreement.79 
Second, given the insistence of the Court of Justice on the principle of autonomy, an arbitration 
system could only be established if there was a mandatory preliminary reference procedure from 
the arbitration to the CJEU whenever the dispute turned on interpretation of a reference to EU 
law or a concept identical to EU law. Such mandatory preliminary reference procedures exist 
already in a few international agreements concluded between the EU and non-members of the 
EU. For example, Articles 267 of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement,80 322 of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement,81 and 403 of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement82 provide 
that ‘Where a dispute raises a question of interpretation of a provision of Union law […], the 
arbitration panel shall not decide the question, but request the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to give a ruling on the question [...] The ruling of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union shall be binding on the arbitration panel.’  
The difference with the aforementioned models, however, will be the scope of such arbitration 
system. Given the ambition of the future relationship, it is expected that the EU-UK arbitration 
system will have largely unprecedented competence in international law practice as it could 
reach far beyond trade disputes and extend across many areas of law. And if within this dispute 
settlement mechanism there is space for a mandatory preliminary reference procedure, the 
influence of the Court of Justice will continue in the post-Brexit era. 
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Conclusion 
Brexit is arguably the most significant constitutional moment for the UK in decades. The gradual 
detachment of the UK legal order from the EU, with which the UK has shared more than 40 
years of symbiotic relationship, raises a number of questions, one of which relates to the role of 
the main arbiter and interpreter of EU law, the Court of Justice.  
The UK government has declared that in ‘taking back control of its laws’ it needs to distance 
itself from the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice and should put an end to the primacy of its 
case law. It is true that the role of the Court of Justice and EU law in general will be more limited 
after Brexit takes place than it is at present. However, it is almost impossible to envisage the UK 
legal order becoming completely ‘watertight’ from the ‘tide’ of EU law. 
The WA that regulates the terms of withdrawal of the UK provides for a significant role for the 
CJEU with regard to citizens’ rights and with regard to dispute settlement more generally. If 
there is a compromise on the ‘Irish border question’ along the lines described by the 
Commission, the CJEU will also remain a court for part of the UK. In addition, the terms of the 
EU (Withdrawal) Act acknowledge that UK courts will be influenced by the case law of the 
Luxembourg court. Finally, the principle of autonomy suggests that an ambitious FRA should 
acknowledge and take into account the role of the CJEU. 
In other words, the rumours of the death of the CJEU are greatly exaggerated … 
  
	
